Syrian and Turkish concerns.” He asks the following questions: “Are Syrian Kurds trying to copy the Iraqi Kurdistan Region? How do they interpret their right to self-determination? How do they handle Turkey`s concerns over the establishment of another federal Kurdistanregion on its border?”
Asked to confirm whether the statements of the Turkish prime minister are true – about the Syrian authorities placing some northern Syrian areas under the control of the PKK to fight the Turkish Government – Bashar says: “The liberation of some areas in Syria`s Kurdistan was carried out by the Kurdish people through their leadership in the Kurdish national movement. At the beginning, each Kurdish party hoisted its own flag, but at the end, an agreement was reached to raise the Syrian independence flag side by side with the Kurdish flag on the government buildings that are liberated from the dictator`s regime of Damascus.” Asked whether the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party, which is the Syrian branch of the PKK, is the side that runs the affairs of these areas, Bashar says: “All Kurdish organizations operating in the Syrian arena are jointly running the affairs of these areas. The Syrian KurdishDemocratic Party denies that it has any relations with the PKK and emphasizes that it is a Syrian political party, operating in Syria.”
Asked to confirm that no Kurdish flags are hoisted in northern Syrian areas, Bashar says: “We hoist the Kurdish flag side by side with the [Syrian] independence flag.” Asked to confirm also that the establishment of the Higher Kurdish Commission to run the affairs of the Syrian Kurdish area is similar to the case of Iraqi Kurds, he confirms that this commission was established “to achieve stability in the Kurdish area, but not necessarily copying Iraq`s example or experience.” He adds: “This is because the situation in Syria has different factors and, thus, Syrian Kurds will have their own pattern.”
Asked why Syrian Kurds did not participate in the Syrian “revolution” except recently, Bashar says: “We participated in the revolution from the beginning, and the Syrian Kurdish National Council insisted at the time on keeping the revolution peaceful, but now it has turned into an armed revolution. It is our legitimate right to participate. However, the Syrian regime has been avoiding any clash with the Kurdish people in Syria`s Kurdistan.” He explains that the Syrian regime has been avoiding clashing with Syrian minorities, focusing on Arab Sunnis only.
Asked whether some Kurdish parties have allied with the Syrian regime, Bashar says: “All Kurdish parties agreed on three strategic points: Toppling the bloody dictatorial regime in Syria, replacing it with a democratic regime, and stressing the importance of ethnic and religious multiplicity in Syria, including the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people.” Asked to confirm whether 650 Syrian Kurdish fighters crossed into Syria from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, where they received training to fight against the Syrian regime in their areas, Bashar says that many Kurds defected from the Syrian Army and that some of them left for the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and some others joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA,) reiterating: “We have not reached a political decision yet to have them participate in the fighting, but this decision might be made later.”
Asked to verify the parties to which those who received training in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region belong, Bashar says that these are independent elements, who have put themselves at the disposal of the Syrian Kurdish National Council and the joint higher command. Concerning whether these elements are behaving in northern Syrian areas like the Peshmerga in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and whether they are not taking part in the Syrian revolution, Bashar says: “We are part of the Syrian revolution and are working jointly with all brothers in all parts of Syrian territory.” He notes that several Kurdish elements were killed in fighting in Damascus and other areas. He adds: “One of their duties is to defend Kurdish strategic areas and to defend Kurds if the regime attempts to attack them.” Mu`awad states that this means that the Kurds do not depend on the Free Syrian Army, FSA, to protect them in their areas. Bashar thanks the FSA for its great efforts to topple the regime, noting that Kurdish elements are participating in fighting in Aleppo side by side with the FSA.
Asked whether he had noticed the contradictory stands between the president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the government in Baghdad over the Syrian crisis, Bashar confirms that this contradiction was observed from the beginning of the “revolution.”
Asked to confirm a statement he made on the need to have the right to self-determination implemented, a right approved by the Kurdish National Council last year, Bashar says: “The Kurdish 
National Council approved two points and insisted on their implementation: First, the right to self-determination on Syrian territory and, second, political decentralization.” He adds that he “is looking forward to the establishment of a geographical federalism that has a particular political system in Syria`s Kurdistan.” He emphasizes that self-determination should take place without encroaching on Syria`s territorial integrity.
Mu`awad notes that Burhan Ghalyun of the Syrian National Council had ruled out the establishment of a federal system in Syria on grounds that there is no recognized Kurdish region in the country, and he asks Bashar to comment. Bashar says that he respects Ghalyun`s opinion, reiterating that Ghalyun should go back to the history of Syria and see how Syria was established to realize that there are Kurdish areas in Syria in which the Kurds
have been living for centuries as original inhabitants, not as migrants. He emphasizes that nobody can deprive the Kurds of the ability to exercise their right to self-determination, “through reaching a Syrian accord in this regard.” He adds that there are Christians and Arabs living among Kurds in the northern parts ofSyria, which does not annul the fact that there is a Kurdistan region in that area. Asked whether Syrian Kurds` concentrations are in Al-Hasakah and Al-Qamishli areas only, Bashar says that 75 per cent of the people in the Al-Hasakah Governorate are Kurds. Bashar criticizes some Syrian oppositionists for adhering to the Ba`th Party mentality in dealing with the Kurdish issue.
Asked whether Turkey will accept a Kurdish entity on its border with Syria, as is the case with Iraq, Bashar says: “Turkey is not the side that makes decisions on this issue; rather, it is the Kurdish people in Syria in agreement with the Syrian people. Turkey rejected the Iraqi Kurdistan Region at the beginning, but now Turkey is the main economic and political partner of this region. We expect Turkey to accept this fact if it takes its interests into deep consideration.”Turkey`s intervention, whether through appointing a governor or in any other form, is not in the interest of the Syrian Kurds. If Turkey wanted to help the Syrian Kurds, it would have better arranged its own internal affairs and given national rights to its 25 million Kurds. However, the government of Turkey is strongly interfering in the Kurds` affairs in Syria, which is against the interests of the Kurds.
The Free Kurdish Army was formed from the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a group with historical links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK. The PKK, it should be remembered, is regarded by both Turkey and the United States as a terrorist organization fighting the Turkish government for Kurdish autonomy. The Kurds are reportedly concentrating their efforts on wresting control of Qamishli, the largest of the Kurdish cities, from the Syrian government. Kurdish forces have already captured the city of Ayn al-Arab in the Aleppo Governorate, where they are flying the Kurdish flag.
The Turks, who have been at war with the PKK for decades, have been monitoring developments in Syria with increasing concern. Thus a columnist for the Turkish daily Hurriyet wrote in late July: “Only a week ago we had a 400-kilometer ‘Kurdish border.’ Now, 800 kilometers have been added to this.”1 The Turkish government has bluntly warned: “We will not allow a terrorist group to establish camps in northern Syria and threaten Turkey.”2Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made clear that Turkey would take any step that is necessary against a terrorist presence in northern Syria.3
Turkish observers have commented that the geopolitics of the Middle East are now being reshaped as the emergence of a “Greater Kurdistan” is no longer a remote possibility, posing enormous challenges for all the states hosting large Kurdish populations: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran.4 Kurdistan is a potential land bridge for many of the conflicts erupting in this part of the region. It provides a ground route for Iraqi Kurdistan to supply the Syrian Kurds as they seek greater autonomy from Damascus. But its use will depend on which power dominates the tri-border area between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. This area could equally provide Iran with a corridor for moving supplies to its Syrian surrogates and even to Hizbullah in Lebanon. Perhaps this is why some commentators see Kurdistan as the new regional flashpoint in the Middle East.
An overview of the Kurds and Kurdistan will help put these latest events in context.
The Kurds in Today’s Middle East
- The Kurds are an Indo-European people who immigrated to the Middle East, like the Iranians. They mostly inhabit a region known as Kurdistan that includes adjacent parts of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Kurds constitute 7 percent of the population in Iran, 15-20 percent in Iraq, perhaps 9 percent in Syria, and 20 percent in Turkey. In all of these countries except Iran, Kurds form the second largest ethnic group. Roughly 55 percent of the world’s Kurds live in Turkey, about 18 percent each in Iran and Iraq, and slightly more than 5 percent in Syria.
- The number of Kurds living in Southwest Asia is estimated at 26 to 34 million, with another one or two million living in the diaspora. Kurds are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East after Arabs, Persians, and Turks.
- While Turkey hosts the largest Kurdish population in the Middle East, the question of Kurdish independence should be treated separately from the cases of Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Although Turkish-Israeli relations have deteriorated during the rule of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Israeli policy should be based on the eventual restoration of Israeli-Turkish strategic cooperation. Hence Israeli policy toward the Kurdish issue should not undermine the territorial integrity of the Turkish state, or be interpreted in that manner.
- The most likely candidate for Kurdish independence is the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq. The conflicts between the KRG and the central Iraqi government in Baghdad have been steadily growing over oil exploration agreements, the location of internal boundaries, and Kurdish rights under the Iraqi constitution. Iraqi Kurdish leaders warned in 2012 that they will seek independence if their differences with Baghdad are not addressed. In the meantime, with the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki backing the regime of Bashar Assad and the KRG helping the Syrian Kurds, Iraqi-Kurdish tensions have been steadily rising.
- Turkey, which in the past was the main constraint on the Iraqi Kurds, has become the dominant external economic force in the KRG. It has proposed new pipelines for Kurdish oil through Turkish territory. Turkey’s objections to a KRG bid for independence are seen to be declining. This might change if the KRG became fully allied with the Syrian Kurdish insurrection, which includes parties that back the anti-Turkish PKK.
- The establishment of a viable, independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq could be a geopolitically positive development for Israel. Historical justice would dictate that, with 22 Arab states in the Middle East, the 35 million Kurds deserve at least one sovereign state of their own. Beyond Iraq, the emergence of more Kurdish independent areas is unlikely. The state system in the Middle East has been surprisingly robust since the advent of the Arab Spring; Syria might become a federated state, but is not expected to completely disintegrate.
- The Kurdish question places many Western states in a hypocritical position, especially given the efforts they constantly invest in the Palestinian issue. The millions of Kurds currently dispersed among Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Armenia do not benefit from the right of self-determination, granted to them over ninety years ago after World War I. Today the Kurds are the largest national grouping without a state of their own.
Nevertheless, despite the common goal of independent statehood, the Kurds in various countries are hardly unified. It was the constant rivalries between tribes, clans, families, and villages that caused Kurdistan’s partition among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria in the first place. The Kurds are also divided linguistically since they speak at least four different dialects of the Kurdish language. The Kurds have not yet understood the lessons of history, and their divisions are greater than the glue that can bind them together. Moreover, with adversaries such as Turkey and Iran, it might be possible to consider a smaller independent Kurdish entity limited to Iraq, while Syrian Kurds achieve self-determination in the framework of a Syrian federal state.
The Kurds emerged as an ethnic group in the medieval period. They are believed to be of heterogeneous origins, combining a number of earlier tribal or ethnic groups including Median Semitic, Turkic, and Armenian elements. Most Kurds
are Sunni Muslims belonging to the Shafi’i school. Mystical practices and participation in Sufi orders are also widespread among Kurds. There is also a minority of Kurds who are Shia Muslims, primarily living in the Ilam and Kermanshah provinces of Iran and in central and southeastern Iraq (Fayli Kurds), and some who are Alawites, mostly living in Turkey.
The Kurdish language comprises the related dialects spoken by the Kurds.5 A northern dialect of Kurdish calledKurmanji is spoken in Turkey, the Kurdish areas of Syria, and the most northern parts of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdish language holds official status in Iraq as a national language along with Arabic; it is recognized in Iran as a regional language, though the Iranians regard Kurdish as a dialect of Persian. In Armenia it is a minority language.
In the southern areas of Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as in western Iran, another dialect called Surani or central Kurdish is spoken. Speakers of Kurmanji and Surani can understand each other. A third Kurdish dialect, known as Zaza, is really a separate language. Kurmanji and Surani speakers usually cannot understand speakers of Zaza. A fourth linguistic group among the Kurds are speakers of Gulani, which is closer to Zaza. The Kurds also use different writing systems, relying on the Latin alphabet in Turkey. While they use an Arabic script in Iraq and Iran, a Cyrillic script is used in Armenia. For purposes of nation-building, the Kurds will need to produce a standardized Kurdish language.
The Kurdistan Region in Iraq is largely mountainous, with the highest point being a 3,611-meter (11,847-foot) summit known locally as Cheekah Dar (Black Tent). The mountains are part of the larger Zagros range, which is also part of Iran. Many rivers flow through the region’s mountains, and the area is notable for its fertile land, plentiful water, and picturesque landscapes. The Great Zab and the Little Zab flow from east to west in the region. The Tigris River enters Iraq via the Kurdistan Region after flowing from Turkey.
The mountainous nature of Iraqi Kurdistan
the variance of temperatures in its different parts, and its wealth of water make it a land of agriculture and tourism. It is also rich in minerals and particularly oil, which for a long time was extracted via pipeline through Iraq. The largest lake in the region is Lake Dukan, and there are several smaller ones such as the Duhok Lake.
The western and southern sections of the Kurdistan Region are not as mountainous as the east. They are characterized by rolling hills and sometimes plains, and are greener than the rest of Iraq.
Historical Background
After defeating Shah Ismail I in 1514, Ottoman Sultan Selim I annexed Armenia and Kurdistan and entrusted the disposition of the conquered territories to Idris, a historian who was a Kurd from Bitlis in Turkey. Idris divided the territory into sanjaks or districts and, making no attempt to interfere with the principle of heredity, installed the local chiefs as governors. He also resettled the rich pastoral country between Erzerum and Erivan, which had lain in waste since the conquests of Timur (Tamerlane), with Kurds from the Hakkari and Bohtan districts.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ottoman centralist policies aimed to remove power from the principalities and localities and this directly affected the Kurdish emirs. The first modern Kurdish nationalist movement emerged in 1880 with an uprising led by a Kurdish landowner and head of the powerful Shemdinan family, Sheikh Ubeydullah. He demanded political autonomy or outright independence for Kurds and the recognition of a Kurdistan state without interference from Turkish or Persian authorities. The uprising against Qajar Persia and the Ottoman Empire was ultimately suppressed by the Ottomans, and Ubeydullah, along with other notables, was exiled to Istanbul.
The Kurdish ethnonationalist movement that emerged following World War I and the end of the Ottoman Empire was largely a reaction to the changes taking place in mainstream Turkey. These included radical secularization, which the strongly Muslim Kurds abhorred; a centralization of authority that threatened the power of local chieftains and Kurdish autonomy; and rampant Turkish nationalism in the new Turkish Republic, which threatened to marginalize the Kurds.
The Kurds, however, were also in internal conflict over the destiny of their country. Some, very open to the pan-Islamist ideology of the sultan-caliph, had seen the salvation of the Kurdish people in a status of cultural and administrative autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. Others, claiming to take inspiration from the principle of nationalities, the ideas of the French Revolution, and American President Woodrow Wilson, fought for Kurdistan’s total independence.
The split was accentuated following the Ottoman defeat by the Allied Powers in 1918. Those fighting for independence hurriedly put together a delegation at the Versailles Conference to present “the claims of the Kurdish nation.” This helped place the Kurdish national question on the international agenda. The Treaty of Sèvres, concluded on 10 August 1920 between the Allies – France, Great Britain, and the United States – and the Ottoman Empire, actually recommended, in section 111 (art. 64), the creation of a Kurdish state in part of Kurdistan:
If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 2 [i.e., Turkey] shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it shall be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas.
This treaty, however, was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne signed on 24 July 1923, which was concluded with modern Turkey after the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution. The Treaty of Lausanne did not provide any guarantee of the Kurds’ rights and handed the major part of Kurdistan over to the new Turkish state. Beforehand, in accordance with the Franco-Turkish Agreement of 20 October 1921, France had annexed the Kurdish provinces of Jazira and Kurd-Dagh to Syria, placing them under France’s mandate. Iranian Kurdistan, of which a large part was controlled by the Kurdish leader Simko, lived in a state of near-dissidence vis-à-vis the Persian central government.
The fate of the petroleum-rich Kurdish province of Mosul, which is today part of Iraq, remained undecided. Both the Turks and the British claimed it. The Treaty of Sèvres also addressed the question of Iraqi Kurdistan, stating that “no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State [in Turkey] of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul Valiyet.”
After the Treaty of Sèvres unraveled, Britain’s imperial planners in the Colonial Office insisted on including Kurdistan in their mandate for Iraq so as to add to its Sunni population and offset the plurality of the Iraqi Shia. The League of Nations recognized the annexation of Kurdistan to Iraq in 1925. The British promised to make Iraqi Kurdistan autonomous once Iraq gained its independence. That commitment was not fulfilled either by the British or the Iraqi regime that succeeded their administration in 1932 as Iraq became independent.
Thus, at the end of 1925, the country of the Kurds, known since the twelfth century as Kurdistan, found itself divided between four states: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
Copyright 2013. JAN KALAN
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JAN KALAN 